The Circumstantial Evidence
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing resulted in intelligence that indicated that Al Qaeda had planned the attack and was planning further attacks on bridges and tunnels in New York City.
1993: An expert panel commissioned by the Pentagon raises the possibility that an airplane could be used to bomb national landmarks. [Washington Post 10/2/01]
In 1995, an Al Qaeda group headed by one Ramzi Youssef, was planning to seize and blow up 12 commercial aircraft over the Pacific. One Abdul Hakim Murad, a co-conspirator of Youssef, admitted to U.S. authorities that he had been trained at American flight schools and had been involved in a plot to crash a commercial aircraft into the CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia.
1998: U.S. investigators discover that Al Qaeda personnel involved in the Embassy bombings in Africa are part of a larger plan involving the training of terrorist members at American flight schools for attacks on American targets.
1998: The CIA ignore warnings from Case Officer Robert Baer, that Saudi Arabia is harboring an Al Qaeda cell led by two known terrorists. A more detailed list of known terrorists is offered to Saudi intelligence in August 2001 and refused. [Financial Times, January 12, 2001]
1998: An Oklahoma City FBI agent sends a memo warning that "large numbers of Middle Eastern males" are getting flight training and could be planning terrorist attacks. [CBS, 5/30/02] A separate CIA intelligence report asserts that Arab terrorists are planning to fly a bomb-laden aircraft into the WTC. [New York Times, 9/19/02; Senate Intelligence Committee, Witness Hill, 9/18/02]
December 1998: A Time magazine cover story entitled "The Hunt for Osama," reports that bin Laden may be planning his boldest move yet -- a strike on Washington or possibly New York City. [Time magazine, 12/21/98]
1999: It is learned that Al Qaeda personnel were plotting to blow up the Los Angeles International airport and selected targets in Jordan. Following the trial of an Al Qaeda man, Ahmen Ressam who was caught smuggling explosives into the United States, the FAA issues an official warning that Al Qaeda is expected to conduct explosive outrages against commercial aircraft or American airports.
Following this emerged a number of actual Al Qaeda threats against targets in the United States, often involving aircraft and aircraft facilities.
In the period just prior to the September 11 aircraft attack on American targets, numerous specific reports were delivered from what can only be termed entirely reliable foreign sources (as distinct from domestic intelligence reporting).
September 1999: A U.S. intelligence report states bin Laden and Al Qaeda terrorists could crash an aircraft into the Pentagon. The Bush administration claims not to have heard of this report until May 2002, although it was widely shared within the government. [CNN, 5/18/02, Associated Press, 5/18/01; Guardian, 5/19/02]
1999: MI6, the British foreign intelligence agency delivers a secret report to the London U.S. Embassy stating that Al Qaeda plans to use commercial aircraft "possibly as flying bombs." [Sunday Times, 6/9/02]
October 24-26, 2000: Pentagon officials carry out a "detailed" emergency drill based upon the crashing of a hijacked airliner into the Pentagon. [Source Military District of Washington News Service, 11/3/00] The White House later asserts that no one in government had envisioned a suicide hijacking. [Associated Press report, May 18, 2002]
January, 2001: The Bush Administration orders the FBI and intelligence agencies to "back off" investigations involving the bin Laden family, including two of Osama bin Laden's relatives (Abdullah and Omar) who were living in Falls Church, VA -- right next to CIA headquarters. This followed previous orders dating back to 1996, frustrating efforts to investigate the bin Laden family. [BBC “Newsnight,” Correspondent Gregg Palast, Nov 7, 2001]
Feb 13, 2001: UPI Terrorism Correspondent Richard Sale -- while covering a trial of bin Laden's al Qaeda followers -- reports that the National Security Agency has broken bin Laden's encrypted communications. Even if this indicates that bin Laden changed systems in February, it does not mesh with the fact that the government insists that the attacks had been planned for years.
May 2001: The U.S. introduces the "Visa Express" program allowing any Saudi Arabian to obtain visas through their travel agent instead of appearing at a consulate in person. Three to five hijackers use Visa Express over the next month to enter the U.S. [US News & World Report, 12/12/01, Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/20/02, Witness Hill]
June 2001: German intelligence, the BND, warns the CIA and Israel that Middle Eastern terrorists are "planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack important symbols of American and Israeli culture." [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 14, 2001]
June 13, 2001: Egyptian President Mubarak, through his intelligence services, warns the U.S. that bin Laden's Islamic terrorist network is threatening to kill Bush and other G8 leaders at their July economic summit meeting in Italy. The terrorists plan to use a plane stuffed with explosives. [New York Times, 9/26/01]
Summer 2001: An Iranian man phones U.S. law enforcement to warn of an imminent attack on the World Trade Center in the week of September 9. German police confirm the calls but state the U.S. Secret Service would not reveal any further information. [German news agency online.de, September 14, 2001]
June 2001: German intelligence warns the CIA, Britain's MI6, and Israel's Mossad that Middle Eastern terrorists are training for hijackings and targeting U.S. and Israeli symbols. [“Fox News,” 5/17/02]
June 26, 2001: The CIA informs the White House that they had intercepted foreign intelligence traffic concerning possible Al Qaeda strikes in America on July 4.
Summer 2001: Russian intelligence notifies the CIA that 25 terrorist pilots have been specifically training for suicide missions.
June 22, 2001: The military's Central and European Commands impose "Force Protection Condition Delta," the highest anti-terrorist alert.
June 28, 2001: National security advisor Condoleeza Rice states: "It is highly likely that a significant Al Qaeda, attack is in the near future, within several weeks."
July 1, 2001: Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California) a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee states that her staff had advised her of a “major probability of a terrorist incident within the next three months.” [Emphasis added]
July 2, 2001: The FBI reports to the White House that Al Qaeda terrorist attacks outside the United States are very possible and that domestic attacks could not be discounted.
July 5, 2001: The CIA informs President Bush that Al Qaeda attacks against American targets are entirely possible during the summer of that year.
July 5, 2001: The government's top counter-terrorism official, Richard Clarke states to a group gathered at the White House: "Something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon." The group included the FAA, the Coast Guard, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the INS. Clarke directs every counter-terrorist office to cancel vacations, defer non-vital travel, put off scheduled exercises and place domestic rapid response teams on much shorter alert.
July 10, 2001: A Phoenix FBI agent sends a memorandum warning about Middle Eastern men taking flight lessons. He suspects bin Laden's followers and recommends a national program to check visas of suspicious flight-school students. The memo is sent to two FBI counter-terrorism offices, but no action is taken. [New York Times, 5/21/02] Vice President Cheney says in May 2002 that he opposes releasing the memo to congressional leaders or to the media and public. [CNN, 5/20/02]
July 26, 2001: Attorney General Ashcroft stops flying commercial airlines due to a threat assessment. [CBS, 7/26/01] He later walks out of his office rather than answer questions about this. [Associated Press, 5/16/02]
July 31, 2001: The FAA urges U.S. airlines to maintain a "high degree of alertness."
Late July 2001: The U.S. and UN ignore warnings from the Taliban foreign minister that bin Laden is planning an imminent huge attack on US soil. The FBI and CIA also fail to take seriously, warnings that Islamic fundamentalists have enrolled in flight schools across the U.S. [Independent, 9/7/02]
August 2001: Russian President Vladimir Putin orders Russian intelligence to warn the U.S. government "in the strongest possible terms" of imminent attacks by suicide pilots on airports and government buildings. [MS-NBC interview with Putin, September 15, 2001, Fox, September 17, 2001]
August 2001: The FBI arrests an Islamic militant linked to bin Laden in Boston. French intelligence sources confirm that the man is a key member of bin Laden's network and the FBI learns he has been taking flying lessons. At the time of his arrest the man is in possession of technical information on Boeing aircraft and flight manuals. [Reuters, September 13 2001]
Late summer 2001: Jordanian intelligence agents go to Washington to warn that a major attack is planned inside the U.S. and that aircraft will be used. Christian Science Monitor calls the story "confidently authenticated" even though Jordan later backs away from it. [Christian Science Monitor, 5/23/02]
August 6, 2001: The CIA also presents a warning to the President, explicitly concerned with terrorism inside the United States, indicating that bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. Actual content of this message has been the subject of considerable debate, with White House officials understandably downplaying its significance. [Time magazine, May 16, 2002; New York Times, May 16, 2002]
August 15, 2001: An alert civilian instructor at a Minnesota flight school calls the FBI: "Do you realize that a 747 loaded with fuel can be a bomb?" The next day, Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested. After investigating Zacarias Moussaoui's past, the FBI (with the help of French Intelligence) learns that he had Islamic extremist connections. They also knew he was interested in flight patterns around New York City, and that he had a strong desire to fly big jets, even though at the time he didn't have a license for flying even a Cessna.
August 20, 2001: The French government strongly informs high level American authorities about pending attacks on American targets, using commercial aircraft a
August 8-23, 2001: Two high ranking Israeli Mossad agents come to Washington to warn the FBI and CIA that up to 200 terrorists have slipped into the U.S. and are planning an imminent major assault in the U.S. Indications point to a highly visible target. [Telegraph, 9/16/01; Los Angeles Times, 9/16/01; “Fox News,” 5/17/02] The Mossad gives the CIA a list of terrorists. A major Israeli spy ring was hard on the heels of at least four members of the 9/11 hijackers, including lead hijacker Mohammed Atta. [BBC, 10/2/01]
August 24, 2001: The head of the Mossad reports the imminence of an Arab attack against American targets; a similar report was made by the Mossad on September 7, 2001.
August 24, 2001: Frustrated with lack of response from FBI headquarters about detained suspect Moussaoui, the Minnesota FBI begins working with the CIA. The CIA sends alerts calling him a "suspect 747 airline suicide hijacker." Three days later an FBI Minnesota supervisor says he is trying keep Moussaoui from “taking control of a plane and fly it into the WTC." [Senate Intelligence (Hill #2), 10/17/02] FBI headquarters chastises Minnesota FBI for notifying the CIA. [Time magazine, 5/21/02]
August 2001: Britain gives the U.S. another warning about an Al Qaeda attack. The previous warning was vague. This one specifies imminent multiple airplane hijackings by Al Qaeda. [Sunday Herald, May 19, 2002]
Late August, 2001: The CIA asks the INS to put (these two of the hijackers) Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi on a watch list because of their ties to the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. On August 23, 2001, the INS informed the CIA that both Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi had already slipped into the country. Immediately thereafter, the CIA asked the FBI to find al-Midhar and Alhazmi. This should not have been difficult, since one of them was listed in the San Diego phone book, and the other took out a bank account in his own name; also, an FBI informant happened to be their roommate.
September 10, 2001: NSA intercepts two messages in Arabic. One message read: “Tomorrow is zero hour,” and the second: “The match begins tomorrow.” [New York Times, August 10, 2002; Reuters, June 19, 2002] On June 19, 2002, CNN reported the contents of these two National Security Agency intercepts. Other news outlets, including the Washington Post, also reported on the intercepts. [New York Times, August 10, 2002]
A particularly urgent warning was received the night before the attacks, causing some top Pentagon brass to suddenly cancel travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of “sudden security concerns.” [Newsweek, 9/12/2001] “Why that same information was not available to the 266 people who died aboard the four hijacked commercial aircraft may become a hot topic on the Hill." [Newsweek, 9/13/2001]
September 11, 2001: For 35 minutes, from 8:15 AM until 9:05 AM, although widely known within the FAA and the military that four planes have been simultaneously hijacked and taken off course, no one notifies the President of the United States. It is not until 9:30 AM that any Air Force planes are scrambled to intercept, but by then it is too late. This means the National Command Authority waited for 75 minutes before scrambling aircraft, even though it was known that four simultaneous hijackings had occurred -- an event that has never happened in history. [CNN; ABC; MS-NBC; Los Angeles Times; New York Times]
Department of Defense (6/1/01) and FAA (7/12/01) procedure: In the event of a hijacking, the FAA hijack coordinator on duty at Washington headquarters requests the military to provide escort aircraft. Normally, NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) escort aircraft take the required action. The FAA notifies the National Military Command Center by the most expeditious means. [DoD, 6/1/01; FAA, 7/12/01; FAA, 7/12/01] If NORAD hears of any difficulties in the skies, they begin the work to scramble jet fighters [take off and intercept aircraft that are off course]. Between September 2000 and June 2001 fighters were scrambled 67 times. [AP, 8/12/02] When the Lear jet of golfer Payne Stewart didn’t respond in 1999, F-16 interceptors were quickly dispatched. According to an Air Force timeline, a series of military planes provided an emergency escort to Payne’s stricken Lear about 20 minutes after ground controllers lost contact with his plane.[Dallas Morning News, 10/26/99]
September 11, 2001:
8:20 AM (approx.): Air traffic controllers suspect Flight 11 has been hijacked. [New York Times, 9/15/01]
8:40 AM: NORAD is notified of hijacking. [New York Times, 10/16/01; Washington Post, 9/15/01]
8:46 AM: Flight 11 crashes into the World Trade Center north tower (approximately 26 minutes after controllers lost contact). [New York Times, 9/12/01]
8:46 AM: Bush later states, "I was sitting outside the classroom and I saw an airplane hit the tower. The TV was on.” [CNN 12/4/01] “When we walked into the classroom, I had seen this plane fly into the first building.” [White House, 1/5/02]
8:52 AM: Two F-15s take off from Otis Air Force Base. [Washington Post, 9/15/01] They go after Flight 175. Major General Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, states "the pilots flew like a scalded ape, topping 500 mph but were unable to catch up to the airliner. We had a nine-minute window, and in excess of 100 miles to intercept 175. There was just literally no way.'' [Dallas Morning News, 9/15/01] F-15's fly at up to 2.5 times the speed of sound (1875 mph or 30+ miles a minute or 270+ miles in nine minutes) and are designed for low-altitude, high-speed, precision attacks. [BBC]
8:56 AM: By this time, it is evident that Flight 77 is lost. The FAA, already in contact with the Pentagon about the two hijackings out of Boston, reportedly doesn’t notify NORAD of this until 9:24, 28 minutes later. [New York Times, 10/16/01]
9:03 AM: Flight 175 crashes into the south WTC tower (23 minutes after NORAD notified, 43 minutes after air traffic control lost contact with pilots). [New York Times, 9/12/01, CNN, 9/12/01]
9:10 AM: Major General Paul Weaver states Flight 77 came back on the (radar) scope at 9:10 in West Virginia. [Dallas Morning News, 9/15/01] Another report states the military was notified of Flight 77 several minutes after 9:03. [Washington Post, 9/1/01]
9:24 AM [? – see above]: The FAA, who 28 minutes earlier had discovered Flight 77 off course and heading east over West Virginia, reportedly notifies NORAD. A Pentagon spokesman says, "The Pentagon was simply not aware that this aircraft was coming our way." [Newsday, 9/23/01; New York Times, 9/23/01] Yet since the first crash, military officials in a Pentagon command center were urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do. [New York Times, 9/1/01]
9:28 AM: Air traffic control learns that Flight 93 has been hijacked. [MSNBC, 7/30/02]
9:38 AM: Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon (42 minutes or more after contact was lost, one hour after NORAD notification of first hijacking). [New York Times, 10/16/01; CNN, 9/12/01]
10:10 AM: Flight 93 crashes in Pennsylvania (42 minutes after contact was lost). [CNN, 9/12/02]
September 12, 2001: Senator Orrin Hatch says the US was monitoring bin Laden supporters and overheard them discussing the attack. [ABC, 9/1/01; Associated Press, 9/12/01]
September 13-19, 2001: Members of bin Laden's family are driven or flown under FBI supervision to a secret assembly point in Texas and then to Washington, where they leave the country on a private charter plane when airports reopen three days after the attacks. [New York Times, September 30, 2001]
